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Abstract
The observed “soft” coordination at European and national level has hindered progress in
terms of raising social welfare and reducing the risk of poverty in EU. This is a source of
concern given that the fruits of economic efficiency should be shared by the individuals and
Member States of EU in an equitable manner. Raising social welfare would assist the process
of building up the necessary social consensus in favour of structural reforms in product and
capital markets, which in turn would further enhance economic efficiency. This paper focuses
on a key indicator of social policy in national agendas which is the social expenditure as a
percent of the GDP so as to assess whether there is convergence in social policy across
European countries. The empirical analysis utilises information from 18 European countries
over the period 1990-2004 and appropriate methodological tools of absolute ó-convergence
and analysis of distribution dynamics.
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1. Introduction 
The EU has taken huge strides towards an integrated economy through the creation of 
the single market and the introduction of the euro. Undoubtedly, the social and 
economic benefits of this process of integration would produce gains in terms of 
higher GDP, of more jobs and of improving welfare. As reported in a recent report of 
European Commission (2005a) completion of a single market in services is expected 
to lead to an increase of GDP by 0.6% and employment by 0.3% over the medium 
term. To accelerate the process of integration and improve economic efficiency 
Lisbon strategy was launched in March 2000 by the Spring EU Council, setting a ten-
year time table to make the EU the world's ‘most dynamic and competitive economy’. 
Five years later, Europe appears to come in terms with the ambitious time table of 
meeting the targets of Lisbon strategy as failing coordination at European and national 
level together with sometimes conflicting priorities have hindered delivery (European 
Commission 2006a).  As a result the European Commission (2006a) proposed to the 
European Council, as well as the European Parliament and the European social 
partners, to re-launch and refocus the Lisbon Strategy towards ‘working together for 
growth and jobs’. The proposal was accepted by the Council and EU Parliament, 
while a progress report acknowledged that promising forward steps have taken place 
(see European Commission, 2006b).  
Although, the re-launch of Lisbon Strategy identifies the importance of raising 
social welfare and create jobs as a prerequisite in order to build the necessary social 
consensus for successfully implementing reforms that would in turn enhance 
economic efficiency, the need for further action in the area of social policy remains 
high.  As noted by Bertola (2003) while in the economic front there has been 
“positive integration” though explicit collective arrangements, social policies have 
been dealt with a “soft” and “open” coordination process. Effectively, this implies 
that social policy lacks coordination at European and national level. This certainly is a 
source of concern since markets are not well equipped to handle income risks and the 
gains of economic efficiency do not need to be shared in an equitable way across 
individuals and European countries.  
In particular, given the soft coordination of social policies in Europe one needs 
to assess these policies at national level. In turn, national governments address the 
problems associated with income inequality and poverty through social transfers. The 
share of social expenditures in a country’s GDP is considered to be a rough indicator 
of social concerns in the national policy agenda (e.g. Bertola, 2006). This study focus 
on this particular indicator in order to assess whether there is an on going process of 
convergence in social expenditures in Europe.  To this end, it relies on information 
from a cross-section of European countries over the period 1994-2004 and two 
methodological tools. The first is the notion of σ-convergence (e.g. Friedman, 1992; 
Lichtenberg, 1994) which means narrowing of an appropriate index of inequality 
overtime. The second is notion of distribution dynamic relating to changes in the 
external shape of an evolving cross-section distribution over time as well as to intra-
distribution dynamics such as mobility, persistence and club formation (e.g. Quah, 
1993).  
In what follows, section 2 presents the data and section 3 the methodological 
framework. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while section 5 concludes.  
  
2. The Data  
 
 The data for the empirical analysis come from Eurostat (2006) and refer to 18 
European countries (15 EU member states plus Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland). 
Diagram 1 shows the cross-sectional average of the variable of interest for each year 
of the sample. Average social expenditure as a percent of the GDP increased rapidly 
from 1990 to 1993 but followed a downward trend for a prolonged period of time 
from 1994 to 2000. Since 2000 this trend appears to be reversed, but stabilizing at 
lower level than the one of 1993. Given that it is well evident that income inequality 
has been increasing over the period considered in this study (e.g. Bertola 2003 and 
2006), the depicted decline of social protection benefits has an impact on income 
inequality and poverty. It is also worth noting that the period of declining social 
protection benefits coexisted with the period of the required nominal economic 
convergence prior to the adoption of the common currency. It is, therefore, of interest 
to examine whether there has been a convergence also in terms of social protection 
benefits in Europe over this period. 
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Diagram 1: Social Protection Benefits as %of GDP 
(Average Values for 18 European Countries)
  Source: Eurostat. 
 
3. Methodological Framework 
 3.1 The σ-Convergence 
 As mentioned in the introduction σ-convergence takes place when an 
appropriate measure of inequality exhibits a downward trend over time. A number of 
alternative measures of inequality are available in the literature (e.g. Sen, 1997). Here, 
we employ the variance which reflects absolute deviations from the cross-sectional 
average. A consistent test for absolute σ-convergence has been developed by Carree 
and Klomp (1997). The relevant test statistic can be computed as  
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3.2  The Analysis of Distribution Dynamics  
 The analysis of σ-convergence provides information on just one parameter of 
an evolving cross-section distribution. Of equal importance, however, are the so-
called intra-distribution dynamics which provide information on persistence and 
mobility, churning-like behavior within distribution where countries with initially low 
levels social expenditures catch up and even overcome high level ones. For the study 
of distribution dynamics we employ here transition probability matrices, as proposed 
by Quah (1993).  
 
Let us denote the variable/stochastic process of interest (here social benefits as 
% of the GDP) byα  and its cross-section distribution at time t  by tF . Associated 
with tF  is a probability measure tλ , where ).()),((: yFyRy tt =−∞∈∀ λ  A simple 
model for the evolution of tF  or equivalently of tλ  is an autoregression in measures 
such that for every measurable set A it is the case that 
 
)2()(),(1 adAaM tt ∫=+ λλ . 
In (2), M is a ‘transition kernel’, that is the transition density function, 
mapping tλ  into 1+tλ  and trucking, thus, where in 1+tF  points in tF  end-up (1993). 
Rewriting (2) as a convolution 
)3(*1 tt M λλ =+  
and iterating yields a predictor for cross-section distributions 
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Taking (4) to the limit as ∞→s one can characterize the likely long-run or 
‘ergodic distribution’ of the stochastic processα . The transition kernel is usually 
estimated by taking discretizations of the probability measure tλ , converting, thus, M  
into a transition probability matrix.  M encodes information on intra-distribution 
dynamics that means information on persistence and mobility, switches in ranks 
between countries and distances traversed when such switches happen.  
 
4.1. The Empirical Results 
 4.1 σ-Convergence 
 The test statistic presented in Equation (1) has been computed for the 
variances and the covariance of the initial (1990) and the final (2004) years in the 
sample. The empirical value of the test statistic turned out to be 11.97, while the 
theoretical values at the 5 and the 1 percent levels of significance are 3.84 and 6.63, 
respectively. Thus, the null hypothesis of no σ-convergence is rejected at any 
reasonable level of significance. Indeed, there is strong evidence that the dispersion of 
social expenditures as a percent of the GDP has been decreasing over the sample 
period.    
  
4.2 Distribution Dynamics 
 Transition probability matrices with four states (0: lowest; 1: lower middle; 2: 
upper middle; and 3: highest) have been estimated using the TSRF econometric 
package (Quah, 2000). Table 1 presents the one-step, which is one-year, transition 
probability matrix for 1990-2004.  The upper limits for each state have been 
determined by dividing the space of possible values into discrete cells such that there 
is roughly equal number of country/year observations in each cell. First row and the 
first column present the states and the associated with each state range of values. The 
remaining rows and columns contain the one-step transition probabilities defined as  
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where 3,2,1,0, =ji  denote states.      
  
Table 1. The One-Step Transition Probability Matrix  
States 0 
(13.16-21.35] 
1 
(21.35-25.6] 
2 
(25.6-27.9] 
3 
(27.9-37.64] 
0 
(13.16-21.35] 
0.89 0.11 0 0 
1 
(21.35-25.6] 
0.03 0.77 0.20 0 
2 
(25.6-27.9] 
0 0.14 0.77 0.09 
3 
(27.9-37.64] 
0 0 0.07 0.93 
 Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
 The elements in the main diagonal provide information about mobility or 
persistence. According to the results, 89 percent of countries in state 0 in any given 
year will end up in the same state in the immediately following year. For state 3 the 
relevant figure is 0.93, while for states 1 and 2 the figures are somehow lower, 0.77. 
We conclude therefore, that one year persistence has been very strong for the 
countries with the highest and the lowest benefits, while mobility has been relatively 
easier for the lower and the upper middle ones. The off-diagonal elements provide 
information on the type of mobility upwards or downwards. For example, the 
probability that a country in state 2 will transit to state 3 is 0.09 and the probability 
that it will transit to state 1 is 0.14. 
 
The k -step transition probability is defined as   
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Table 2 presents the 5-step transition probability matrix obtained by iterating 
the one-step matrix 5 times.  
Table 2. The Five-Step Transition Probability Matrix  
States 0 
(13.16-21.35] 
1 
(21.35-25.6] 
2 
(25.6-27.9] 
3 
(27.9-37.64] 
0 
(13.16-21.35] 
0.271 0.318 0.283 0.127 
1 
(21.35-25.6] 
0.093 0.288 0.355 0.264 
2 
(25.6-27.9] 
0.058 0.249 0.345 0.348 
3 
(27.9-37.64] 
0.021 0.151 0.284 0.544 
 Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
As expected, mobility is much higher in a five-year horizon.  This is especially 
true for states 0, 1 and 2.  However, almost 55 percent of countries in state 3 will 
remain in that state after five years. An aggregate measure of mobility proposed by 
Shorrocks (1978) can be calculated as  
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where N is the total number of states and tr(P) is the trace of the one transition 
probability matrix, and it can be decomposed into upwards and into downwards 
mobility measures (Gang et al., 2004). Here the aggregate measure of mobility is 
0.231, while upwards mobility is considerably higher than downwards mobility, 0.13 
vs. 0.08.  
  
The ergodic distribution is unconditional in the sense that it gives the 
probability that a country will occupy a given state in the long-run, independently of 
the state it belonged in the initial period. Table 3 presents the ergodic along with the 
initial (1990) distribution.  
 
 
Table 3. Ergodic and Initial (1990) Distribution  
 Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
 
As far as the ergodic distribution is concerned, the balk of the probability 
mass, 71 percent, is concentrated in states 2 and 3. In the initial distribution, however, 
the probability mass, 78 percent, was concentrated in states 1 and 2. In other words, 
with the time the distribution of social protection benefits changes from a distribution 
with a long right tail to the one long left tail. This is perfectly consistent with the fact 
that upwards dominates downwards mobility.  
 
A relevant question is how fast the actual distribution approaches the steady 
state one. This can be assessed from the system’s half life obtained as: 
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where 2λ is the second eigenvalue of the one-step probability matrix. Here, the half-
life is 7.8 years indicating a rather fast pace.  
 
Of certain importance is the knowledge of the time required for transitions 
from one position of the benefits distribution to another.  This can be empirically 
investigated using the notion ‘first passage time’ (Narayan Bhat, 1972). Let )(nijf  is 
the probability that the first visit of the process to state j  when it begun from state 
i will take place in n steps. Formally, 
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The expected value of the first passage time is then 
States Probabilities 
 Ergodic Initial 
0 0.065 0.333 
1 0.224 0.444 
2 0.319 0.167 
3 0.392 0.056 
∑
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Here we consider transitions from 16.54 percent (average value for Ireland 
which remains in all years in state 0) to 26.3 per cent (average value for EU-15), and 
from 26.3 to 32.9 percent (average value for Sweden which is in all years in state 3). 
For comparison purposes we consider both transitions to higher values as well as 
transitions to lower values. Table 4 presents the results.  
 
Table 4. Expected First Passage Times 
 
 Subsequent Level 
Initial 
Level 
26.3 32.9 26.3 16.54 
16.54 14.28    
26.3  23.52   
32.9   13.32  
26.3    144.78 
 Source: Authors’ Estimations. 
 
It appears that transitions to the EU average either from above or from below 
take less time compared to those from the EU average to the tails of the benefits 
distribution, especially the lower one. It is worth noting that it would take, on average, 
145 years to transit from 26.3 to 16.54.     
                   
5. CONCLUSIONS 
While the economic process is one of “positive integration”, social policy is 
currently lacks strong coordination at European and national level. This is a source of 
concern since an efficient allocation of the economic activity does imply equitable 
income distribution ex post. This paper focuses on the evolution of social 
expenditures as a percent of the GDP which is a key indicator of the importance of 
social concerns in national policy agendas.  Both the absolute σ-convergence as well 
as the analysis of distributions dynamics of the variance of interest for 18 European 
countries over the period 1990-2004 indicated that there is a movement towards a 
common model of social expenditures.  
The amount spent on reducing inequality and providing poverty relief is one 
aspect of social policy. The other is the effectiveness of social spending that means 
the reduction in inequality and/or in poverty induced by a given level of spending. 
Further research, therefore, would examine the relationships among key variables 
such as inequality and per capita income, poverty and poverty relief, and social 
transfers and poverty relief. That type of analysis would rely both on standard 
parametric econometrics (e.g. regression analysis) and on modern non parametric 
econometrics which can yield information on how the entire cross-section distribution 
of inequality or poverty responds to a change in the level of social spending.     
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